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Introduction
In the last 30 years, academics and policymakers have shown increasing interest in the independence of central banks. Especially during the 1990s, many countries around the world adopted new central bank laws and granted their monetary institutions a greater degree of autonomy [see e.g., Cukierman (2008) ]. In the European Union, the Maastricht Treaty has enabled the European Central Bank (ECB) to pursue monetary policy independent of national governments. The United Kingdom granted the Bank of England full autonomy in 1997 and many other countries followed suit. At the same time, average inflation rates have decreased in almost all countries. This co-movement of independence and inflation has occurred in both OECD or non-OECD countries. As an example, OECD countries have on average experienced a reduction in average inflation by roughly 15 percentage points. CBI has on average increased by 0.30.
However, the scatter-plot shows no clear negative relationship between the changes in CBI and the changes in inflation. In addition, the empirical literature on this issue casts doubt 1 Indicators of central bank independence are taken from Cukierman et al. (1992) and Crowe and Meade (2007) . Both indicators are based on the methodology of Cukierman et al. (1992) , overlap for 69 countries and are normalized to the unit interval. Countries with inflation rates above 50% are excluded from the figure. on the effectiveness of CBI for price stability. Although earlier studies primarily identify a negative link between CBI and inflation, especially in industrialized countries [see e.g., Grilli et al. (1991) , Cukierman (1992) or Alesina and Summers (1993) ], the results of more recent studies are rather ambiguous [see e.g., Eijffinger and de Haan (1996) , Campillo and Miron (1997) or Klomp and de Haan (2010) ]. The previous literature has made numerous attempts to explain the impact of CBI on inflation using different indicators of CBI, employing different sample periods and countries and controlling for all kinds of additional determinants of inflation. Surprisingly, comparatively few attempts have been made to study the conditions under which CBI can enhance a country's inflation performance.
While many studies include a wide variety of control variables for inflation, the literature sparely addresses the interaction between certain control variables -e.g., the quality of political institutions -and CBI. In this paper, we argue that the quality of political institutions is an important determinant of the relationship between CBI and inflation.
From a theoretical point of view, increasing CBI helps to solve time-inconsistency problems by strengthening the reputation of monetary policy. However, indicators of CBI convey little information about the credibility of such an arrangement. To achieve the beneficial reputation effects of CBI, the established institutional design needs to be credible. High-quality political institutions might generally be associated with greater trust in governmental decisions and legal arrangements. As a result, the quality of institutions might be a positive determinant of the reputation effects of CBI. Chile and Venezuela provide helpful anecdotal evidence in support of our hypothesis. In the 1980s, both countries suffered from similarly high average inflation rates (21% and 20%). In addition, Chile and Venezuela increased the independence of their central banks to a similar extent (0.33 and 0.37). 2 However, whereas Chile established price stability in the first decade of the twenty-first century (with an average inflation rate of around 3%), the inflation problem in Venezuela persisted. The remarkably different inflation performance of these two countries may be reflected in discrepancies in institutional quality. If we measure institutional quality on the basis of political stability, rule of law or democratic accountability using the World Bank's governance indicators [Kaufmann et al. (2009) ], Chile displays much higher institutional quality on average than does Venezuela (0.64 / 0.74 / 0.65 and 0.31 / 0.29 / 0.42). These differences may be crucial to the reputation of monetary policy design and hence to the effectiveness of CBI. We expect that institutional quality directly influences the marginal effect of CBI on inflation.
2 Detailed data descriptions can be found in section 3.1 and in the appendix.
The main questions of our paper are as follows. Can we identify a relationship between CBI and inflation? If so, does the institutional quality of countries influence this relationship?
How do institutional quality and CBI interact with each other?
To answer the above questions, we examine a dataset of up to 69 countries. Unlike in most of the literature, which primarily focuses on pure cross-section samples, we study the relationship between CBI and inflation by exploiting the time dimension of CBI data. Additionally, we allow for possible nonlinearities in the relationship between CBI and inflation.
The impact of institutional quality on the marginal effect of CBI is studied by estimating interaction models. Our main findings can be summarized as follows. Institutional quality has a significant impact on the relationship between CBI and inflation. Increasing institutional quality is correlated with improved CBI effectiveness for a country's inflation performance. Our analysis reveals that granting a central bank more autonomy does not necessarily lead to better inflation performance. To lower inflation by increasing independence, two conditions have to be fulfilled: (1) The change in independence needs to be sufficiently large, and (2) the quality of institutions has to be sufficiently high.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2.1 briefly discusses the theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between CBI and inflation. In Section 2.2, we discuss the role of institutional quality in the effectiveness of CBI with regard to inflation performance enhancement. Section 3.1 describes the empirical methodology and the dataset. Section 3.2 presents the estimation results. A large number of robustness checks are presented in Section 3.3. Section 4 concludes.
Some theoretical considerations 2.1 The link between CBI and inflation
The theoretical rationale for central bank independence is based on the research on timeinconsistent policies [Kydland and Prescott (1977) , Barro and Gordon (1983)] . Rogoff (1985) shows in his seminal paper that a society will see its welfare increase after appointing a conservative central banker and isolating monetary policy from political pressure. Hence, central bank independence in combination with a stronger focus on price stability helps to ease the inflationary bias. As a result, for a given degree of conservatism, CBI should be negatively related to inflation rates.
The empirical evidence backing the conventional view that central bank independence helps to achieve low inflation is somewhat mixed. Eijffinger and de Haan (1996), Berger et al. (2001) , Hayo and Hefeker (2008) provide excellent reviews of the empirical literature.
One stylized fact that emerges from earlier studies is a negative relationship between CBI and the level of inflation, especially in industrialized countries. Posen (1995) shows that the degree of CBI is determined by the strength of financial sector opposition to inflation.
This means that the direction of causality may run from inflation to CBI.
There may be various reasons for the ambiguous findings. Particularly in developing and transition countries, there is a discrepancy between rules and practices [see e.g., Forder (1996 ), Berlemann and Nenovsky (2004 . Fry (1998) shows that legal independence poorly reflects actual independence. Hayo and Hefeker (2002) ]. According to the seminal work of Rogoff (1985) , the inflationary bias depends on the combination of central bank independence and conservatism. Thus, the empirical evidence on the relation between CBI and inflation may be distorted when differing levels of conservatism are not taken into account.
Third, the time-dimension of central bank independence and inflation data has been widely neglected up until now. In earlier studies, this was primarily due to a lack of time-variant indicators of independence. A recent study by Crowe and Meade (2008) finds a significant negative relationship between CBI and inflation when exploiting the time dimension of the dataset but is unable to identify a significant link in a pure cross-section analysis.
One reason for this result might be that exploiting the time dimension of the dataset may diminish possible omitted variable bias.
Fourth, the marginal effect of CBI on inflation may not be constant. Earlier studies find a significant relationship between CBI and inflation, but this is the case only for a sample of industrialized countries [e.g., Cukierman et al. (1992) ]. Temple (1998) also shows that the effect of CBI on inflation disappears if higher inflation economies are included. He argues that one reason for this might be a nonlinear effect of CBI. However, to our knowledge, there are no studies so far that explicitly take nonlinear effects into account.
Fifth, existing empirical studies provide little evidence on the conditions under which CBI can have beneficial effects on inflation performance. While many studies include a wide variety of control variables for inflation, the literature sparely addresses the interaction between certain control variables -e.g., the quality of political institutions -and CBI. Two notable exceptions are the papers by Keefer and Stasavage (2003) and Hayo and Voigt (2008) . We argue that the quality of political institutions is an important determinant of the link between CBI and inflation.
This paper mainly addresses the latter three issues. We follow a comparative-static approach to study the impact of institutional quality on the link between CBI and inflation and consider possible nonlinearities in the effect of independence. The first two issues; i.e., possible measurement problems of actual CBI and the distinction between conservatism and independence, are not the primary focus of our analysis. However, we try to address these issues in the robustness section of this paper.
The role of institutional quality
The quality of institutions matters in attempts to assess the link between CBI and inflation for various reasons. First, it is a determinant of inflation and thus a necessary control variable in estimations. For example, Campillo and Miron (1997) From a theoretical perspective, the relationship between CBI and inflation can be explained as follows. Increasing the level of CBI helps to solve time-inconsistency problems by enhancing the reputation of monetary policy. Hence, inflation expectations can be anchored at a low level, which helps to perpetuate price stability. However, to achieve the beneficial reputation effects of CBI, the institutional design needs to be credible. Whereas the most indicators of CBI primarily reflect information regarding the legal status quo of the central bank design, they hardly contain information on the credibility of such an arrangement.
Even though independence prevents short-run monetary policy from being subject to political influence, the choice of a central bank design might still be susceptible to political pressure, which would prevent reputation building.
We argue that the quality of political institutions is crucial to the credibility of central bank design. High-quality political institutions might generally be associated with a higher level of trust in governmental decisions and legal arrangements. As a result, the quality of political institutions might be a positive determinant of the reputation effects of CBI.
Aspects of institutional quality that we expect to be particularly important are the stability and effectiveness of the government and the bureaucratic system, democratic accountability and the rule of law. For example, in a democracy, any political action bears the risk of punishment by the voters. The opportunity for punishment increases the accountability of policy-makers. Under the assumption that central bank independence is socially beneficial [see Rogoff (1985) ] greater democratic accountability makes it more costly for politicians to deviate from the socially preferred central bank design and thus increases the credibility of CBI. We also expect political stability to have an impact on the credibility of CBI. For example, frequent government changes may precipitate revisions to central bank design and have a negative impact on the credibility of the legal design of monetary policy. However, even in an unstable government, the impact of government changes may be counteracted by the existence of a strong and high-quality bureaucratic system that can act as a shock absorber and minimize policy revision [see e.g., Busse and Hefeker (2007)]. Finally, the rule of law as a general indicator of trust in the legal system might also indirectly reflect the level of trust in government institutions, including the central bank.
For the reasons mentioned, we argue that institutional quality should not simply be used as a control variable in explaining inflation or as an instrument for CBI; rather, it should be directly linked to the marginal effect of CBI on inflation. Hence, our empirical strategy is to identify the impact of measures of the quality of political institutions on the relationship between CBI and inflation using interaction models.
3 Empirical analysis
Empirical specification and data
To address our research questions, we use the following procedure. Table A .6.
As mentioned above, exploiting the time dimension may diminish possible omitted variable bias. In the simple linear version of our 'comparative-static' cross-section approach the estimation equation has the following form:
where the dependent variable Δ reflects the change in the average inflation rate between (1980-1989) and (1998-2007) [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] and controls for initial level effects. In the empirical analysis, we also make use of the inflation tax as an alternative measure of inflation performance. The inflation tax (defined as
is a commonly used measure in the unit interval, reflecting the depreciation rate of mo- To control for possible nonlinearities, we extend equation (1) by a quadratic term for the change in independence ((Δ ) 2 ), resulting in
A positive value of 3 would imply that the marginal effect of increasing CBI is positively related to the magnitude of CBI changes. A negative value of 3 would imply that the marginal effect of increasing CBI is negatively related to the magnitude of CBI changes.
Hence, large changes in CBI result in a disproportionate decrease (increase) in inflation relative to small changes. As shown in the results section below, we find evidence of nonlinearities. Hence, in the following, we use the quadratic specification of equation (2).
To analyze the impact of the quality of institutions on the CBI-inflation nexus, we specify the following interaction model:
where is a measure of institutional quality. We use a wide variety of potential proxies for institutional quality, namely democratic accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, corruption, rule of law and freedom of press from different data sources. The corresponding sources and definitions are described in the appendix A.2. In equation (3), institutional quality interacts with the changes in CBI. The interaction model implies that the marginal effect of a change in CBI on inflation performance depends on the value of the conditioning variable institutional quality. In other words, a positive 6 indicates that for a given Δ , the marginal effect increases when increases; i.e., the effectiveness of changes in CBI is larger for better institutions. To properly interpret the interaction terms, we must include the level of institutional quality [see Brambor et al. (2006)]. As in the case of CBI, we allow for nonlinearities in the effect of institutional quality and include a quadratic term ( 2 ). 5 Based on equation (3), the marginal effect of a change in CBI on a change in inflation is given by
and the corresponding confidence intervals can be derived using the estimated variance of the marginal effect:
Empirical results
Results I Table 1 displays the results regarding the link between the change in CBI and the change in inflation not considering the impact of the quality of institutions (see equations (1) and (2)). 6 Column (1) presents the estimation results for equation (1). We are able to explain a large proportion of the variance in the change in inflation (adj. R 2 of 82%). As expected, the initial level of inflation is highly significant. The positive sign of coefficient 1 indicates that the decrease in inflation is higher in countries with poor initial inflation performance. Contrary to our expectations, the coefficient of Δ is negative. Note that this implies that increasing CBI is associated with an increase in inflation. However, the coefficient does not turn out to be significant in this specification. In column (2), we use the inflation tax as a measure of inflation performance. The qualitative results are unchanged. According to the estimations of the simple specification in equation (1), increasing the independence of a central bank does not seem to come along with enhanced inflation performance. All columns with odd numbers refer to the change in inflation and all columns with even numbers refer to the change in inflation tax. In columns (5) and (6) all countries which experienced an absolute change in inflation of more than 200 percentage points are excluded. All t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Estimates are based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. Significance levels are reported as follows: * for a 10%, ** for a 5% and *** for a 1%-significance-level.
Columns (3)-(6) display the results of the estimation of the nonlinear specification in equation (2). The results in column (3) and (4) are based on an estimation using the complete sample of 69 countries. With the change in inflation rates as the dependent variable (column (3)), only the initial level turns out to be significant. However, the estimation results on the basis of the inflation tax (column (4)) now differ heavily. The constant and the initial level are highly significant. As in the linear specification, the coefficient of Δ is negative but now becomes significant at the 10%-level. The coefficient of the quadratic term (Δ ) 2 is significantly positive; i.e., the marginal effect of increasing CBI on changes in inflation is positively related to the magnitude of CBI changes. Hence, countries with large changes in CBI seem to have, on average, experienced a disproportionate change in their inflation tax relative to countries with small changes.
The difference in the results between inflation and inflation taxes indicates that the insignificance in column (3) are due to an outlier bias of high inflation observations. In columns (5) and (6) we, thus, exclude the seven countries which experienced an increase or a decrease in inflation of more than 200 percentage points. The results are now similar to those in column (4). As a consequence, we control for the outlier effect in the remainder of the paper. Smoothing the change in the inflation performance using inflation taxes seems to be the adequate procedure which allows to keep all cross section information and which is also in line with much of the empirical literature.
Even if the coefficients of Δ and (Δ ) 2 are significant, the overall marginal effect might be insignificant. Table 2 presents the marginal effect ∂Δ /∂Δ = 2 + 2 ⋅ 3 ⋅ Δ based on equation (2) for the specification with the entire sample in column (4). Although we were not able to identify a significant relationship between CBI and inflation in the linear specification, controlling for possible nonlinearities reveals that CBI might be negatively related to inflation performance when there are large variations in CBI. Due to the empirical relevance of the nonlinearities, we continue to use the quadratic specification.
Results II
To analyze the impact of the quality of institutions on the link between CBI and inflation, we estimate the interaction model specified in equation (3). The estimates for two measures of institutional quality (democratic accountability and political stability) from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) dataset [PRS-Group (2007) ] as well as for different specifications are displayed in Table 3 . In addition, Table A .3 in the appendix shows the estimates (i) for other institutional quality measures (government effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory quality, corruption and the freedom of press) and (ii) for different data sources (ICRG, World Bank and Freedom House data). Significance levels are reported as follows: * for a 10%, ** for a 5% and *** for a 1% significance-level.
Columns (1) to (4) show the estimation results for the measure of political stability. Columns (5) to (8) display the results for the measure of democratic accountability. The results of the baseline specification (equation (3)) are shown in columns (1) and (5). Relevant control variables, as proposed by Campillo and Miron (1997) , are considered in columns (2) and (6).
9 We add the initial levels of (log)GDP ( 80/89 ), (log)GDP per capita ( 80/89 ) and the (log)trade volume relative to GDP ( 80/89 ) as a proxy for openness. Different from Campillo and Miron (1997), we additionally include the change of the latter three variables since we follow a comparative-static approach in this paper [see Crowe and Meade (2008) ]. The level of GDP is included to control for country size effects, the GPD per capita controls for various structural disparities as differences in the financial sector, technologies or optimal inflation [see Campillo and Miron (1997) ]. According to Romer (1993) , openness should be negatively related to average inflation. Surprise expansion of monetary policy is less beneficial in open economies because real exchange rate depreciations that come along with monetary expansion are more harmful in such countries.
Furthermore, we account for the fact that monetary policy may have been restricted by the exchange rate system. By pegging its currency, a country can import inflation and may then experience a decrease in inflation that cannot be attributed to central bank design.
Using a classification by Caramazza and Aziz (1998), we include a dummy for countries that are either classified as "pegged" or "limited flexible" ( ). 10 We also incorporate dummies for Sub-Saharan, East Asian and Latin American countries to control for regional effects.
The remaining four columns address the issue that previous studies prevalently identified a significant relationship between CBI and inflation for industrialized countries only. One reason might be that legal CBI is a precise measure of factual CBI only in such countries.
There is some evidence that de facto central bank behavior heavily deviates from de jure rules in developing and transition countries [Forder (1996 [Forder ( , 1998 , Berlemann and Nenovsky (2004) ]. Therefore, we split the sample in OECD (columns (3) and (7)) and non-OECD countries (columns (4) and (8)).
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Again, the initial level turns out to be highly relevant in all specifications. In column (1), the coefficient of Δ is negative but insignificant. The coefficient of the quadratic term (Δ ) 2 is significant at the 10% level, indicating that the marginal effect of increasing CBI on changes in inflation is positively related to the magnitude of CBI changes. The coefficient of the political stability measure is significantly positive. More institutional quality seems to be associated with a higher decrease in inflation tax over time. However, the coefficient of the quadratic term is negative which implies that the disinflationary benefits of high institutional quality decrease in the level of institutional quality. But this effect is not found to be significant in this specification (p-value of 0.13). The coefficient of the interaction term IQ×ΔCBI has the expected positive sign, but is insignificant. This is also true for the measure of democratic accountability in column (5). However, adding the control variables in columns (2) and (6) has a major impact on the significance of the 10 Because most changes in central bank design occurred in the 1990s, we use the classification by Caramazza and Aziz (1998), which refers to 1997. 11 Note, that further splitting the sample, e.g. to analyze transition countries, would leave us with a very scarce number of observations. We also address the issue of a deviation of factual from legal CBI by using turnover rates of central bank presidents in the robustness section 3.3.
parameters. In particular, the coefficient of the interaction term becomes significant. On the basis of the results in columns (2) and (6) we find evidence in favor of our hypothesis that institutional quality matters for the link between CBI and inflation. 12 Since robustness test reveal that including control variables yields the most stable results across different specifications, we continue to do so in the remainder of the paper.
13 With respect to the control variables, we only find evidence in favor of the hypothesis that openness is inversely related to inflation. The coefficients of both the level and change of openness turn out to be significantly negative.
The evidence in favor of a significant link between institutional quality and CBI effectiveness only seems to hold for highly developed countries. Analyzing the subsample of OECD countries in columns (3) and (7) reveals that the interaction term remains significant and is even larger than in the complete sample. For non-OECD countries (columns (4) and (8)), we are not able to identify a significant impact of institutional quality on the effectiveness of CBI. As mentioned above, this might be due to the fact that legal CBI is not a good proxy for factual CBI in developing and transition countries.
The interaction model asserts that the effect of Δ on Δ depends on the value of the conditioning variable institutional quality ( ). We now calculate the marginal effects and the corresponding confidence intervals on the basis of equations (4) and (5).
To illustrate how the marginal effect of the CBI change on the change in the inflation tax varies with institutional quality, the marginal effect is plotted in Figure 2 higher values of Δ is statistically significant because the coefficient of the quadratic term is significant. For Δ = 0.5, the marginal effect is negative but insignificant in case of low political stability. The cutoff value of political stability (i.e., the value for which ∂Δ /∂Δ = 0) is 0.31. The marginal effect is statistically significant with 90%
12 Table 4 presents more evidence in favor of this hypothesis. In most specifications and for most institutional quality measure, the interaction term is significantly positive. 13 See robustness section 3.3. confidence for values of political stability above 0.50.
14 Finally, we summarize the interaction terms for a number of different specifications and measures of institutional quality in Table 4 to illustrate which aspects of political institutions are particularly relevant to the effectiveness of CBI. The interaction term directly quantifies the impact of institutional quality on the link between inflation and independence. In addition to democratic accountability and political stability Table 4 also contains the results for different institutional quality measures, namely government effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory quality, corruption and freedom of press. Moreover, Table 4 displays the results of two different data sources, (1) ICRG and (2) world bank data. Only the data quantifying the freedom of press is taken from FreedomHouse (2008). We also perform a number of robustness checks by estimating various specifications. Specification (A) is based on estimates using the complete sample and the specification as in equation (3) without additional control variables. In (B) control variables as in columns (2) and (6) of Table 3 are included. To test whether our findings are driven by the richest or poorest countries, we drop countries that belong to the richest and poorest 5% in the sample in specification (C). In (D), we exclude countries with average annual inflation rates above 50% in one of the sample periods (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) to address the findings by Sturm and de Haan (2001) on the effect of high-inflation observations. As a last robustness check, we use ICRG data on internal conflicts to drop the 10% of the countries with the strongest internal conflicts (such as civil war, terrorism and civil disorder) in (E). The significance is analyzed using both ordinary and heteroscedasticity resistent standard errors [White (1980) ]. Significance levels are reported as follows: * for a 10%, ** for a 5% and *** for a 1% significance-level (for estimates using White standard errors) / + for a 10%, ++ for a 5% and +++ for a 1% significance-level (using ordinary standard errors). (A) is based on estimates using the complete sample and the specification as in equation (3) without additional control variables, (B) includes control variables as in columns (2) and (6) of table Table 3 , (C) drops high-inflation countries with an annual average inflation above 50% in (1980, 1989) or (1998, 2007) , (D) excludes the highest and lowest 5% in income per capita, and (E) leaves out the 10% of countries with the strongest internal conflicts (ICRG-data). (1) is based on ICRG-data and (2) is based on data of institutional quality from the world bank. Only the data quantifying the freedom of press is taken from FreedomHouse (2008).
We can summarize the findings as follows. The interaction term is positive in all 10 specifications and for each measure of institutional quality; i.e., increasing institutional quality occurs along with improved effectiveness of CBI in terms of inflation performance. Not surprisingly, the evidence does not differ substantially for different measures of institutional quality; this can be explained by the strong correlation between the different measures. In any event, on the basis of Table 4 , we can cautiously conclude that democratic accountability, government effectiveness, corruption and the freedom of press seem to matter most to CBI effectiveness.
The analysis in this section has revealed that granting a central bank more autonomy does not necessarily lead to better inflation performance. To be able to lower inflation by increasing independence, two conditions must be fulfilled: (1) The change in independence must be sufficiently large, and (2) the quality of institutions must be sufficiently high.
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Based on the specification in column (2) of Table 3 , the data for our sample countries imply that only 13 countries (around 19%) are characterized by a combination of Δ and a level of political stability for which a decrease in the inflation tax can be partially attributed to innovations in central bank design.
Robustness
We perform a number of robustness checks by estimating different specifications and addressing endogeneity issues as well as data problems to verify that the results are stable.
The qualitative results do not change no matter which specification or estimation procedure is used.
First, we test whether the significance of parameters is driven by the use of robust standard errors [White (1980) ]. Even though standard tests indicate heteroscedasticity, the statistical properties of the White estimator are quite uncertain in such small samples. Tables A.1 and A.2 in the appendix replicate Tables 1 and 3 using ordinary standard errors. The significance seems to be independent of the method of computing standard errors, in particular in the specifications including all control variables. Second, Table A .2 in the appendix shows the estimates (i) for other institutional quality measures (government effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory quality, corruption and the freedom of press) and (ii) for different data sources (ICRG, World Bank and Freedom House data). The results are very similar to those in Table 3 , which is not surprising, since the employed measures of institutional quality are highly correlated.
Third, as often addressed in the literature, the degree of CBI may be endogenous and, for example, could depend on the national inflation history. Hence, the change in CBI might, to some extent, be related to the initial level of inflation tax. To address a possible endogeneity bias in our main results, we perform the following procedure: in the first step, we verify that the initial level of inflation is a determinant of the change in independence by estimating
where a significant 1 indicates endogeneity. For all applied institutional measures, the parameter turns out to be significantly positive. As an example: in the specification with democratic accountability, the coefficient is ( 1 = 0.26) and significant at the 1%-level. It seems that countries with poor initial inflation performance adjust central bank laws more substantially. Not surprisingly, the parameter 2 is significantly negative; i.e., countries with a higher initial level of independence experience smaller changes in CBI. In the second step, we use the residuals as an instrument variable for the change in CBI and estimate equation (3) using Two-Stage Least Squares. The residuals seem to be a suitable instrument because they can be interpreted as the fraction of the change in independence that is not determined by inflation history. The residuals are not correlated with the initial level of inflation ( 80/89, ) but are strongly correlated with the change in CBI; i.e, a bivariate correlation of 89% (91%) for democratic accountability (political stability). The results indicate that endogeneity is not a major difficulty in our estimation. The results based on similar specifications as those in Table 3 are displayed in Table A .4 of the appendix and confirm our previous findings. Consequently, we interpret our results as causation, not only as correlation. Sufficiently large changes in CBI seem to lead to inflation performance enhancement.
We estimate a number of additional specifications, the results of which are displayed in Table A .5 in the appendix. The basis for these estimations is the specification in column (6) of Table 3 ; i.e., with democratic accountability and all control variables. 16 In column
(1), we use standard year-on-year inflation rates as dependent variable. The qualitative results remain unchanged. In column (2), we leave out the initial level of the inflation tax since, unsurprisingly, the initial level effect explains most of the change in the inflation tax. The results reveal that quite a large proportion of the variance in the inflation tax change can still be explained by the remaining variables (adj. 2 of 34%). In column (3), we address the issue that the absolute change in CBI and inflation tax might be a biased proxies when trying to measure the true link between CBI and inflation, because they are limited to the unit interval. As a robustness check we base the estimation on the relative changes in CBI and inflation tax. The results, however, remain virtually unchanged. As shown above, the change in CBI is likely to depend on its initial level which might distort the empirical evidence on the link between CBI and inflation. Similar to the two-stage procedure to control for endogeneity between CBI and inflation, we use the residuals of equation (6) as an adjusted measure of the change in CBI. The results are shown in column (4). In column (5), we add an interaction term between the change in CBI and (log)GDP per capita to test whether the effectiveness of CBI is higher or lower in richer countries. The interaction term turns out to be significantly negative without substantially altering the level and significance of the coefficients of interest. Only the coefficient of Δ is now positive (but insignificant). The significant interaction implies that, when controlling for different political institutions, richer countries are characterized by lower effectiveness of innovations in central bank design. The interaction term might to some extent capture additional determinants of the effectiveness of CBI which go beyond political institutions. For instance, richer countries might also have a long history of price stability which in fact may be due to higher degrees of conservatism. Since conservatism and CBI matter for inflation performance, innovations in CBI may not be as relevant for inflation when the degree of conservatism is already high. In column (6), we make use of turnover rates of central banks presidents as provided by Crowe and Meade (2007) . As we have explained earlier, indices of legal CBI might not be good proxies for factual CBI, in particular in developing and transition countries. However, turnover rates which aim at a direct measurement of factual CBI only capture one aspect of CBI. We also loose 10 observations due to data availability. On the basis of turnover rates, we are not able to identify a significant relation between the effectiveness of CBI and the quality of political institutions.
Conclusions
From a theoretical perspective, increasing CBI helps to solve the time-inconsistency problem and should therefore improve countries' inflation performance. However, empirical evidence supporting this conventional view is somewhat inconsistent. In this paper, we argue that one reason for the ambiguous results might be that the conditions under which CBI helps to maintain stable prices have been widely neglected in the literature. We argue that the quality of political institutions is an important determinant of the relationship between CBI and inflation.
The main questions of the paper were as follows. Can we identify a relationship between CBI and inflation? If so, does the institutional quality of countries influence this relationship? How do institutional quality and CBI interact with each other?
Two empirical results should be stressed. First, in exploiting the time dimension of the data, we are not able to identify a significant linear relationship between changes in CBI and changes in inflation. However, we find evidence of a nonlinear relationship between the variables. We are able to provide some evidence that the marginal effect of increasing CBI on changes in the inflation tax is positively related to the magnitude of CBI changes.
Therefore, we conclude that only sufficiently large changes in CBI improve inflation performance. Second, we find strong evidence that institutional quality has a significant impact on the relationship between CBI and inflation. Institutional quality seems to improve CBI effectiveness in influencing inflation performance. The estimation results clearly indicate that for a given change in CBI, the marginal effect increases with institutional quality.
The analysis has revealed that granting a central bank more autonomy does not necessarily lead to better inflation performance. To lower inflation by increasing independence, two conditions have to be fulfilled: (1) the change in independence must be sufficiently large and (2) the quality of institutions must be sufficiently high. Furthermore, institutions and variations in CBI seem to be (imperfect) substitutes. Our analysis also helps us to understand the mixed results in the previous empirical literature. Institutional quality is an important determinant of the relationship between CBI and inflation and should not be neglected in academic and political debates on monetary policy.
Our sample period covers the 'great moderation' which is characterized by a widespread downturn in economic volatility [Stock and Watson (2002) ]. Also, inflation (persistence) is significantly reduced [Cogley et al. (2010) ]. Besides 'good luck', the 'great moderation' is also attributable to improved monetary policy [Summers (2005) All columns with odd numbers refer to the change in inflation and all columns with even numbers refer to the change in inflation tax. In columns (5) and (6) all countries which experienced an absolute change in inflation of more than 200 percentage points are excluded. All t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Estimates are based on ordinary standard errors. Significance levels are reported as follows: * for a 10%, ** for a 5% and *** for a 1%-significance-level. .51*** The TSLS-estimates are based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. All t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are reported as follows: * for a 10%, ** for a 5% and *** for a 1% significance-level. .89*** The estimates are based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. All t-statistics reported in parentheses. Significance levels are reported as follows: * for a 10%, ** for a 5% and *** for a 1% significance-level. The estimation results for the control variables are not reported. In column (1), we use the change in year-on-year inflation rates (Δ ) as dependent variable. In column (2), we drop the initial level of the inflation tax. In column (3), we use the relative change in CBI (CBI-growth) as an alternative measure of innovations in central bank design and relative change in inflation tax (Δ / 80/89 ) as dependent variable. Column (4) displays the results of an estimation on the basis of an adjusted measure of the change in CBI derived from the residuals of equation (6) (CBI-resid). In column (5), we add an interaction term between the change in CBI and initial (log) GDP per capita (GDPpc 80/89 ). In column (6), we make use of turnover rates of central banks presidents as provided by Crowe and Meade (2007) (TURNOVER).
